been able to find is in Giere (1987) , although the idea of applying cognitive psychology and computer modeling to scientific thinking goes back at least to Simon (1966) .
This chapter provides a brief overview of what the component fields of cognitive science bring to the study of science, along with a sketch of the merits of combining methods.
It also considers alternative approaches to science studies that are often antagonistic to the cognitive science of science, including formal philosophy of science and postmodernist history and sociology of science. I will argue that philosophy, history, and sociology of science can all benefit from ideas drawn from the cognitive sciences.
Finally, I give an overview of the rest of the book by sketching how the cognitive science of science can investigate some of the most important aspects of the development of science, especially explanation, discovery, and conceptual change.
Approaches to the Cognitive Science of Science
It would take an encyclopedia to review all the different approaches to science studies that have been pursued. Much more narrowly and concisely, this section reviews what researchers from various fields have sought to contribute to the cognitive science of science.
My own original field is the philosophy of science, and I described in the preface how concern with the structure and growth of scientific knowledge led me to adopt ideas and methods from psychology and artificial intelligence, generating books and articles that looked at different aspects of scientific thinking (e,g. Thagard 1988 Thagard , 1992 Thagard , 1999 Thagard , 2000 . Independently, other philosophers have looked to cognition to enhance understanding of science, including Lindley Darden (1991 ), David Gooding (1990 , Ronald Giere (1988 , and Nancy Nersessian (1984 Nersessian ( , 2009 ). Andersen, Barker, and Cheng (2006) , Magnani (2001 ), and Shelley (2003 also combine philosophy of science, history of science, and cognitive psychology. Collections of work on philosophical approaches to the cognitive science of science include Giere (1992) and Carruthers, Stich, and Siegal (2002) .
Philosophy of science is not just a beneficiary of cognitive science but also a major contributor to it. Since the 1600s work of Francis Bacon (1960) , philosophers have investigated the nature of scientific reasoning and contributed valuable insights on such topics as explanation (Whewell 1967) , causal reasoning (Mill 1970) , and analogy (Hesse 1966 ). Philosophy of science was sidetracked during the logical positivist era by (1) a focus on formal logic as the canonical way of representing scientific information and (2) a narrow empiricism incapable of comprehending the theoretical successes of science.
Logical positivism was as inimical to understanding scientific knowledge as behaviorism was to understanding thinking in general.
In response to logical positivism, Russell Hanson (1958) , Thomas Kuhn (1962) and others spurred interest among philosophers in the history of science, but there was a dearth of tools richer than formal logic for examining science, although Hanson and Kuhn occasionally drew on insights from Gestalt psychology. In the 1980s, when philosophers looked to cognitive science for help in understanding historical developments, we brought to the cognitive science of science familiarity with many aspects of high-level scientific thinking. The method that philosophy of science can most valuably contribute to the cognitive science of science consists of careful analysis of historical case studies.
Most psychologists concerned with scientific thinking adopt a very different method -behavioral experiments. Such experimentation is a crucial part of cognitive science, providing data about many different kinds of thinking that theories aim to explain. Actual scientists are rarely available for psychological experiments, but participants can be recruited from among the modern-day lab rats of cognitive psychologists -university undergraduates.
Much of the valuable work on scientific thinking has been motivated by an attempt to understand how children can develop an understanding of science, a worthy enterprise that is part of both developmental and educational psychology.
Experimental and theoretical work on the development of scientific knowledge has been conducted by many psychologists (e.g. Carey 1985 Carey , 2009 Dunbar 1997 Dunbar , 2001 Dunbar and Fugelsang 2005; Gentner et al. 1997; Klahr 2000; Schunn and Anderson 1999; Tweney, Doherty, and Mynatt 1981; Vosniadiou and Brewer 1992) . Like all cognitive scientists, psychologists can contribute to the development of theories about scientific thinking, but their main methodological contribution consists in behavioral experiments, although some psychologists such as Dedre Gentner and Ryan Tweney also undertake historical studies. Useful collections of work on the psychology of science include Crowley, Schunn and Okada (2001) , Gholson et al. (1989 ), Gorman et al. (2005 , and Proctor and Capaldi (forthcoming) . Other works in the psychology of science tied less closely to experimental cognitive psychology include Feist (2006) , Simonton (1988), and Sulloway (1996) . The introductory chapters below for parts II, III, and IV provide further references to work in the psychology of science on the more specific topics of explanation, discovery, and conceptual change. Newell, Shaw, and Simon (1958) , computer modeling has provided an invaluable tool for developing and testing ideas about mental processes (Sun, 2008b Bridewell et al. 2008; Bridewell and Langley 2010; Kulkarni 1990; Langley et al. 1987; Lindsay, Buchanan, Feigenbaum, and Lederberg, 1980; Schrager and Langley 1990 , Thagard 1992 , Valdes-Perez 1995 To complete this review of how the different fields of cognitive science contribute to the understanding of science, I need to include linguistics and anthropology.
Unfortunately, I am not aware of much relevant research, although I can at least point to the work of Kertesz (2004) on the cognitive semantics of science, and to the work of Atran and Medin (2008) on folk concepts in biology across various cultures. Let me now return to why computer modeling is important for the cognitive science of science.
Methodology of Computational Modeling
What is the point of building computational models? One answer might come from the hypothetico-deductive view of scientific method, according to which science proceeds by generating hypotheses, deducing experimental predictions from them, and then performing experiments to see if the predicted observations occur. On this view, the main role of computational models is to facilitate deductions. There are undoubtedly fields such as mathematical physics and possibly economics where computer models play something like this hypothetico-deductive role, but their role in the cognitive sciences is much larger.
The hypothetico-deductive method is rarely applicable in biology, medicine, psychology, neuroscience, and the social sciences, where mathematically exact theories and precise predictions are rare. These sciences are better described by what I shall whimsically call the mechanista view of scientific method. Philosophers of science have described how many sciences aim for the discovery of mechanisms rather than laws, where a mechanism is a system of interacting parts that produce regular changes (e.g. Bechtel 2008; Bechtel and Richardson, 1993; Bunge 2003; Craver, 2007; Darden, 2006; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Thagard 2006; Wimsatt 2007) . Biologists, for example, can rarely derive predictions from mathematically-expressed theories, but they have been highly successful in describing mechanisms such as genetic variation and evolution by natural selection that have very broad explanatory scope. Similarly, I see cognitive science as primarily the search for mechanisms that can explain many kinds of mental phenomena such as perception, learning, problem solving, emotion, and language.
Computer modeling can be valuable for expressing, developing, and testing descriptions of mechanisms, at both psychological and neural levels of explanation. In contemporary cognitive science, theories at the psychological level postulate various kinds of mental representations and processes that operate on them to generate thinking.
For example, rule-based theories of problem solving from Newell and Simon (1972) to Anderson (2007) postulate (1) representations of goals and if-then rules and (2) search processes involving selection and firing of rules. The representations are the parts and the processes are the interactions that together provide a mechanism that explains mental changes that accomplish tasks. Other cognitive science theories can also be understood as descriptions of mechanisms, for example connectionist models that postulate simple neuron-like parts and processes of spreading activation that produce mental changes (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986) . Computational neuroscience now deals with much more biologically realistic neural entities and processes than connectionism, but the aim is the same: to describe the mechanisms that explain neuropsychological phenomena.
Expressing and developing such theoretical mechanisms benefits enormously from computational models. It is crucial to distinguish between theories, models, and programs. On the mechanista view, a theory is a description of mechanisms, and a model is a simplified description of the mechanisms postulated to be responsible for some phenomena. In computational models, the simplifications consist of proposing general kinds of data structures and algorithms that correspond to the parts and interactions that the theory postulates. A computer program produces a still more specific and idealized account of the postulated parts and interactions using data structures and algorithms in a particular programming language. For example, the theory of problem solving as rule application using means-ends reasoning gets a simplified description in a computational model with rules and goals as data structures and means-ends search as interactions. A computer program implements the model and theory in a particular programming language such as LISP or JAVA that makes it possible to run simulations. Theoretical neuroscience uses mathematically sophisticated programming tools such as MATLAB to implement computational models of neural structures and processes that approximate to mechanisms that are hypothesized to operate in brains.
Rarely, however, do computer modelers proceed simply from theory to model to program in the way just suggested.
Rather, thinking about how to write a computer program in a familiar programming language enables a cognitive scientist to express and develop ideas about what parts and interactions might be responsible for some psychological phenomena. Hence development of cognitive theories, models, and programs is a highly interactive process in which theories stimulate the production of programs and vice versa. It is a mistake, however, to identify theories with programs, because any specific program will have many details arising from the peculiarities of the programming language used. Nevertheless, writing computer programs helps enormously to develop theoretical ideas expressed as computer models. The computer model provides a general analog of the mechanisms postulated by the theory, and the program provides a specific, concrete, analogical instantiation of those mechanisms.
In the biological, social, and cognitive sciences, descriptions of mechanism are rarely so mathematical that predictions can be deduced, but running computer programs provides a looser way of evaluating theories and models. A computer program that instantiates a model that simplifies a theory can be run to produce simulations whose performance can be compared to actual behaviors, as shown in systematic observations, controlled behavioral experiments, or neurological experiments.
There are three degrees of evaluation that can be applied, answering the following questions about the phenomena to be explained: Ideally, a computer program will satisfy all three of these tests, but often computer modeling is part of a theoretical enterprise that is well out in front of experimentation.
In such cases, the program (and the model and theory it instantiates) can be used to suggest new experiments whose resulting data can be compared against the computer simulations. In turn, data that are hard to explain given currently available mechanisms may suggest new mechanisms that can be simulated by computer programs whose behaviors can once again be compared to those of natural systems. The three questions listed in this paragraph apply to models of psychological behavior, but analogous questions can be asked about computational simulations of neural data.
The general interactive process of mechanism-based theory development using computational models is shown in figure 1 .1, which portrays an interactive process with no particular starting point. Note that the arrows between mechanisms and models, and between models and simulations, are symmetrical, indicating that models can suggest mechanisms and programs can suggest models, as well as vice versa. In one typical pattern, experimental results prompt the search for explanatory mechanisms that can be specified using mathematical/computational models that are then implemented in computer programs. Simulations using these programs generate results that can be compared with experimental results. This comparison, along with insights gained during the whole process of generating mechanisms, models, and simulations, can in turn lead to ideas for new experiments that produce new experimental results. Conversely, if the norms that philosophy seeks to develop are to be all relevant to actual human practices, they need to be tied to descriptions of how the world, including the mind, generally works. I have elsewhere defended the naturalistic view that philosophy is continuous with science, differing in having a greater degree of generality and normativity (Thagard 2009 (Thagard , 2010a . This book assumes the priority of scientific evidence and reasoning over alternative ways of fixing belief such as religious faith and philosophical thought experiments, but the assumption is argued for in Thagard (2010a, ch. 2).
The cognitive science of science can take from its philosophical component and also from its applied components a concern to be normative as well descriptive. An interdisciplinary approach to science can aim not only to describe how science works, but also to develop norms for how it might work better. The methodology is captured by the following normative procedure (adapted from Thagard 2010a, p. 211):
1. Identify a domain of practices, in this case ways of doing scientific research.
2. Identify candidate norms for these practices, such as searching for mechanisms.
3. Identify the appropriate goals of the practices in the given domain, such as truth, explanation, and technological applications.
4. Evaluate the extent to which different practices accomplish the relevant goals.
5. Adopt as domain norms those practices that best accomplish the relevant goals.
The descriptive side of cognitive science is essential for all of steps 1-4, but description can quickly lead to normative conclusions via the assessment shown in steps 4-5. My concern in the cognitive science of science is primarily descriptive, but normative issues will arise in chapters on climate change (ch. 5), truth (ch. 6) and values (ch. 17).
Other Approaches to Studying Science
Cognitive science is not the only way to study the practices and results of science, and there are alternative approaches that are antagonistic to it. Cognitive science is scorned by some philosophers, historians, and sociologists who view it as fundamentally inadequate to understand the process of science and other important aspects of human life. I will now concisely review some of these alternatives, and describe why I think their opposition misses the mark.
Within philosophy, the cognitive science of science exemplifies naturalism, the view that philosophical deliberations should be tied to scientific evidence. Naturalistic philosophy has a venerable history, with practitioners such as Aristotle, Epicurus, Bacon, Locke, Hume, Mill, Peirce, Dewey, Quine, and many contemporary philosophers of science and mind.
But philosophy also has a strong anti-naturalistic strain, which challenges the relevance of science to philosophy from various directions. One prominent challenge seeks philosophical truths from reason alone, independent of scientific evidence; such truths are pursued by Plato, Kant, Frege, Husserl, and contemporary philosophers who try to use thought experiments to arrive at conceptual truths (for critiques of this approach, see Thagard 2009 Thagard , 2010a ). This reason-based approach to philosophy tends to be antagonistic to cognitive science on the grounds that mind, like everything else, can be understood most deeply by methods that are a prioriindependent of sense experience.
The anti-psychologistic tendency of philosophy is also evident in contemporary work in the philosophy of science that employs formal methods such as symbolic logic, set theory, and probability theory. All of these tools are potentially relevant to the cognitive science of science, but formal philosophy of science uses them to the exclusion of many other tools (including the varied computational ones mentioned above) that cognitive science can bring to the examination of scientific knowledge. Like some analytic philosophers, some sociologists suffer from psychophobia, the fear of psychology, but cognitive approaches to science are compatible with recognition of important social dimensions of science. For example, in my study of the development and acceptance of the bacterial theory of ulcers, I took into account social factors such as collaboration and consensus as well as psychological processes of discovery and evaluation (Thagard 1999) . Other works in the cognitive science of science have similarly attended to social dimensions (e.g. Dunbar 1997 , Giere 1988 ). The cognitive and the social sciences should be seen as complements, not competitors, in a unified enterprise that might be called cognitive social science. Anthropology, sociology, politics, and economics can all be understood as requiring the integration of psychological and social mechanisms, as well as neural and molecular ones (Thagard 2010b, forthcoming-c) . Novel kinds of computer models are needed to explore how the behavior of groups can depend recursively on the behavior of individuals who think of themselves as members of groups. Agent-based models of social phenomena are being developed, but are only just beginning to incorporate psychologically realistic agents (Sun 2008a; Thagard 2000, ch. 7 , presents a cognitive-social model of scientific consensus). The aim of these models is not to reduce the social to the psychological and neural, but rather to show rich interconnections among multiple levels of explanation.
My hope is that future work using on cognitive-social interactions will provide ways of simulating social aspects of science using techniques under development (Thagard forthcoming-c).
Studies in the Cognitive Science of Science
In the rest of this book, however, I largely neglect social factors in science in order to concentrate on philosophical, psychological, computational, and neural aspects.
Even within the cognitive realm, the investigations reported here are selective, dealing primarily with explanation, discovery, and conceptual change. I understand science broadly to include medicine and technology, which are discussed in several of the chapters.
Part II considers cognitive aspects of explanation and related scientific practices concerned with the nature of theories and theory choice. After a brief overview that makes connections to related work, four chapters develop cognitive perspectives on the nature of explanation, mental models, theory choice, and resistance to scientific change.
Climate change provides a case study where normative models of theory acceptance based on explanatory coherence are ignored because of psychological factors. This part also includes the most philosophical chapter in the book, arguing that coherence in science sometimes leads to truth.
Part III concerns scientific discovery understand as a psychological and neural process. Formal philosophy of science and sociological approaches have had little to say about how discoveries are made. In contrast, this part contains a series of studies about the psychological and neural processes that led to breakthroughs in science, medicine, and technology.
Part IV shows how discoveries of new theories and explanations lead to conceptual change, ranging from the mundane addition of new concepts to the dramatic reorganizations required by scientific revolutions. Four chapters describe conceptual change in the fields of biology, psychology, and medicine. The cognitive science of science inherits from the philosophy of science the problem of characterizing the structure and growth of scientific knowledge. It greatly expands the philosophical repertoire for describing the structure of knowledge by introducing much richer and empirically supported accounts of the nature of concepts, rules, mental models, and other kinds of representations. Even greater is the expansion of the repertoire of mechanisms for explaining the growth of scientific knowledge, through computationally rich and experimentally testable models of the nature of explanation, coherence, theory acceptance, inferential bias, concept formation, hypothesis discovery, and conceptual change. Adding an understanding of the psychological and neural processes that help to generate and establish scientific knowledge does not undercut philosophical concerns about normativity and truth, nor need it ignore the social processes that are also important for the development of scientific knowledge.
Although the cognitive science of science is only a few decades old, I hope that the essays in this book, along with allied work by others, show its potential for explaining science.
